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Abstract 
This paper addresses how marriage and divorce create gender inequality. It focuses on the economic situation of 
men and women after divorce, which constitutes the main component of the gender gap in the standard of living 
in contemporary Japan. The data are drawn from the National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) project, in 
which family sociologists have repeatedly conducted large-scale surveys with national representative samples in 
the fiscal years 1998 (NFRJ98), 2003 (NFRJ03), and 2008 (NFRJ08). The datasets include 473 (NFRJ98), 494 
(NFRJ03), and 463 (NFRJ08) respondents who had undergone divorce. The number of cases is thus adequate to 
obtain statistically reliable estimates through multivariate analysis. The author conducted a series of regression 
analyses to determine the effect of gender on the equivalent household income (i.e., household income divided 
by the square root of the number of people in the household) for divorced men and women, controlling for 
variables such as age, education, household composition, marital status, and employment status. The results 
reveal the powerful and persistent effects of the gender differences in the probability of maintaining one’s 
employment status as an ordinary regular employee and in the probability of co-residing with young children. 
These factors have perpetuated the disadvantageous post-divorce situation for women, while the situation of 
divorced men has been getting worse from 1998 through 2008. Another important factor is remarriage, from 
which men and women receive different economic outcomes. We will discuss the theoretical and political 
implications of the results, with a special attention to the recent family law debates over equity-oriented reforms 
in the system for financial provision on divorce. 
Keywords: marital status, financial provision on divorce, discontinuous career, custody, remarriage  
1.  Introduction 
Increasing divorce is one of the major social changes in Japan today. According to the 2005 Population Census, 
divorced (and remained single) people accounted for 5.4% (4.2% of men and 6.6% of women) of the population 
aged 25–69 (Table 1). The figure was lower in the past: 1.9% (1.2% of men and 2.6% of women) in 1975. Then 
it started to grow and has been almost tripled in these three decades. This change has been parallel to the 
increasing unmarried population. As a result of these changes, the proportion of married people has fallen to 
around 70% in 2005.  
Divorce has thus been a common phenomenon nowadays. In addition, the figure above does not include 
those who remarried. The proportion of those who underwent divorce, including those who remarried, should be 
greater by some percent. If the figure will continue to grow, it is highly possible that in the near future, a large 
proportion of the Japanese population will undergo divorce, as Fukuda Nobutaka (2009) predicted.  
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This increasing divorce is to be subjected to an important concern from the perspective of gender equality, 
because there is a great gender gap in post-divorce living standards. However, although this fact has become a 
commonly accepted theory, there have not been sufficient scientific evidences. There has been a long debate 
among law scholars on equity-oriented reformation of the divorce system, without quantitative evidence for the 
effect of such reformation to achieve gender equality in post-divorce life. Recently, the Government of Japan has 
established the framework of gender-equal policies since late 1990s, but the impact of increasing divorce has 
been out of its focus. Research on post-divorce life has thus been inactive and understaffed.  
In this paper, we aim at quantitative evidences on two critical questions about gender equality in post-divorce 
life.  
 Determination of the gender gap in economic situations by marital status and experiences  
 Decomposition of the factors creating the gender gap after divorce  
The aims have been derived from legal and policy-related concerns about gender equality — especially from the 
legal concern on the possible contribution of the equity-oriented reformation of the divorce system advocated by 
law scholars to lessen the gender gap.  
2.  Literature on Post-Divorce Life and Gender Gap 
2.1.  Quantitative approach to divorced people 
In Japanese society, we have little literature of quantitative research on the economic gender gap in post-divorce 
life. There have been demographic works on the frequency of divorces and the determinants of divorce, 
including Vital Statistics1. However, they are not useful for our purpose, because they contain little detail on 
social and economic aspects of post-divorce life.  
There have been a few sample surveys of divorced people. For instance, the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MHW 1999) conducted such a survey with a sample from the notifications of divorce submitted to the local 
governments. These data can be used to ascertain, to some degree, social and economic aspects of the post-
divorce life at the time of the survey. However, since such surveys do not explore long-term change in economic 
status, the data are not helpful to trace the impact of social and economic positions prior to marriage, during the 
marital life, and after divorce. In addition, there have been few publications of findings from such surveys. On 
the bibliography published by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS 2006: 153–
78; IPSS 2008: 147–54), which carries a huge list of recent publications on divorce in Japan, we can find no title 
related to gender gap in post-divorce life — although the judgment might be incorrect because it was based on 
the listed titles only.  
2.2.  Research of single-motherhood and the hypothesis of marital-life results 
Under these circumstances, studies of single-mother households do provide some degree of data. Numerous 
researchers have conducted empirical studies on this topic, because single-mother households have been one of 
the major targets of social policy, as Iwata Masami (2005) pointed out. Most of these studies lack a perspective 
                                                        
1 Vital Statistics, annually published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, include a record of divorces notified to local 
governments. These statistics form a reliable and official source for the frequency of divorces and the basic demographic 
variables of divorced people. 
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of male-female comparison, as a natural result of focusing on female subjects only. However, some such 
research offers suggestions for exploring gender differences.  
The Japan Institute of Labour (JIL 2003) conducted a project aiming at the secondary analysis of the official 
statistics to establish policies promoting the independence of mothers in single-mother households. As a part of 
this project, Nagase Nobuko (2004) presented a hypothesis on the conditions that cause economic problems for 
women after divorce as follows.  
 Many women quit regular employment and are not employed before the divorce  
 Mothers tend to take custody of young children  
 It is difficult to forge a balance between work and childcare  
Hamamoto Chizuka (2005), Kambara Fumiko (2006), Shinotsuka Eiko (1992), and Tamiya et al (2008) also 
suggested similar factors related to the economic difficulties of single-mother households.  
Nagase (2004) implies that the post-divorce gender gap is created within the marital life before divorce. We 
accordingly refer to Nagase’s hypothesis as the hypothesis of “marital-life results”. If the hypothesis is true, we 
can regard the gap as caused by faults in the family system. As Gary S. Becker (1991) formalized, differences in 
human capital between spouses are due to the effort of specialization in marital life that is established to manage 
the household efficiently. We also mention responsibilities to provide for children, who themselves are an 
outcome of marital life. Divorcing couples shall make a fair settlement of their human capital and childrearing 
responsibilities on divorce. But they often fail to do so. Thereby gender differences emerge through the marital 
life, and consequently bring about the gender gap in the post-divorce life. The hypothesis of marital-life results 
thereby implies the gender inequality after divorce is primarily attributable to the marital life before divorce, 
although Nagase (2004) does not say so explicitly.  
The hypothesis of marital-life results also suggests that the equity-oriented reformation of the divorce system 
could dramatically reduce the gender gap. Since the establishment of the provisions on the division of marital 
property under an amendment to the Civil Code (民法, 1947 Law No. 222), legal scholars2 have for many years 
asserted that financial provision on divorce should cover the husband’s or wife’s human capital and occupational 
status achieved through their cooperation. Recently, Suzuki Shinji (1992) clearly argued that spouse’s earning 
capacity should be subjected to an equitable division at divorce, if it was gained during marital life. Motozawa 
Miyoko (1998: 272–6) gives a comprehensive description of the principle and a practical standard for an 
equitable settlement. Motozawa’s standard calls for an equitable treatment of any changes that have occurred 
during marriage. That is, divorcing couples should restore any change to its original state (i.e., the state before 
marriage), as far as such restoration is feasible. And, if such restoration is unfeasible, they should provide 
monetary transfer to make an equitable settlement concerning the change. Motozawa also argues that such 
treatment includes the following three as typical cases.  
 Disadvantages in employment arising from specialization between husband and wife  
 Burdens related to the raising of their children, including the opportunity cost for an interrupted career 
or for shorter working hours  
                                                        
2 See Tsuneta et al (1955) and Wagatsuma Sakae (1953) for the earliest advocators of the divorce system providing equitable 
settlement of human capital and occupational status. 
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 Disease caused or worsened by the marital life.  
Let us refer to the above new principle for financial provision on divorce as “equity-oriented”, because it is 
logically based on the idea of equitable division of marital properties on divorce. In practical consideration, 
however, both Suzuki (1992) and Motozawa (1998) interpret the principle as calling for equal division. This 
interpretation is in line with the recent trend about the divorce law, often called “2 分の 1 ルール” [the fifty-fifty 
rule], which calls an equal division of marital properties to avoid fruitless and harmful battle between divorcing 
couple. We can expect that the equity-oriented principle thus brings about an equal settlement of any difference 
caused by the marital life. As a matter of course, it will be able to nullify the economic disadvantage of women 
who have specialized in housework or childcare during their marital life.  
2.3.  Recent progress 
The hypothesis of marital-life results was based on insufficient empirical grounds, at least at its starting point. 
Nagase (2004) reached to the hypothesis by inferences made through the comparison of data on single-mother 
households with other official statistics, without any evidence directly supporting the hypothesis.  
A possible counterargument was that many single-mother households were impoverished due to the fact that 
disparities had already been developed during the process of human capital formation prior to marriage. In fact, a 
relatively large proportion of single-mother households are made up of those in which the mother has a low level 
of education, as Fujiwara Chisa (2005) argued. The large number of women who are impoverished after divorce 
could be due to the fact that divorce is concentrated among women suffering disadvantages in human capital 
formation prior to marriage. If so, we cannot think of the gender gap as a result of marital life; we should rather 
think of it as a result from the gender differences in pre-marriage factors.  
Based on this point, Tanaka (2008; 2010) offered quantitative evidences for the hypothesis of marital-life 
results, directly analyzing the economic status after divorce using Japanese national representative data. The 
analyses were on equivalent household income of men and women after divorce. Data were drawn from different 
two projects: SSM2005-J (Tanaka 2008) and NFRJ03 (Tanaka 2010). The results of these analyses clarified that 
the post-divorce equivalent household income of women was 29% (Tanaka 2010) to 36% (Tanaka 2008) lower 
than that of men. Two variables had a major impact on the equivalent household income of divorced persons: (1) 
a continuous career as a regular employee and (2) the co-residence with one’s young children after divorce. 
These variables exerted a great effect after controlling the effect by the level of education. In addition, pre-
marriage employment status did not exert a significant effect (Tanaka 2008). The results of these analyses 
support the hypothesis of marital-life results, indicating that changes in economic situations that arise during 
marriage lead to a post-divorce inequality in living standards.  
3.  The Question to Be Answered 
The author set our goal in this paper as confirmation of the findings on the gender gap and its factors. The above-
mentioned studies have reported stable results in a qualitative term, in favor of the hypothesis of marital-life 
results. However, these results are not stable in a quantitative term. The estimate values produced by the 
analyses differ widely. Therefore, we have not received reliable answers regarding the extent either (1) of the 
post-divorce economic gap between men and women, or (2) of the effects exerted by the factors influencing this 
gap. In this paper, we try to replicate the results of Tanaka (2008; 2010) using large-scale datasets from NFRJ.  
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4.  Data 
We use data from the 1999, 2004, and 2009 iterations of the National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ98, 
NFRJ03, and NFRJ08), conducted by the Japan Society of Family Sociology (Table 2). These are survey data 
from probability samples of Japanese nationals residing in Japan, using the self-administered questionnaire 
(home-delivery, leave-and-pick-up) method. Subjects were chosen through stratified two-stage probability 
sampling. These surveys, which focused on relations between family members and relatives, are characterized by 
their detailed questioning about marital history (including divorce), the attributes of individual children, and 
other family-related events.  
Details for each dataset are in Table 2. The NFRJ98 and NFRJ03 datasets have been opened to the public 
through the Social Science Japan Data Archive (SSJDA), the University of Tokyo (survey number 0191 and 
0517). The use of the NFRJ08 dataset has been closed to the members of the joint-use project  (NFRJ08 研究会) 
of the Japan Society of Family Sociology.  
NFRJ98/NFRJ03 respondents’ age ranged 28–77 (as of the end of 1998/2003). NFRJ08 respondents’ age 
ranged 28–72 (as of the end of 2008). In order to keep comparability among these three datasets, we truncate 
respondents over 72 years old from NFRJ98/NFRJ03 datasets. Thereby the age of the subject for our analysis 
ranges 28–72 for all three datasets.  
Each survey collected data from a large sample of over 9,000 persons, which offers us an adequate size of 
subsample for the analysis on divorced people. The number of respondents who had undergone divorce is more 
than 400 for each dataset. We have thus ensured an enough number of cases to obtain statistically reliable 
estimates.  
5.  Income and Gender Gap 
5.1.  Equivalent household income 
The main variable for the analyses below is the equivalent household income. It is a gauge widely used to 
capture people’s standards of living. This measure deflates household income by household size —by dividing 
income by the square root of the number of people in the household. Assuming that there are economies of scale 
in the management of household finances and that all members of the household receive an equal distribution of 
income, equivalent household income has traditionally been used as an approximate measure of individual 
standards of living (OECD 2001).  
The NFRJ surveys asked about annual household income3 in the year previous to the survey. Respondents 
were required to select from pre-coded categories4 for their income level. The equivalent household income is 
calculated as Equation (1), with l denoting the lower and h denoting the upper limit of the selected income level 
(each in units of 10,000 yen), and n denoting the number of persons co-residing with the respondent (including 
the respondent).  
 
                                                        
3 It is usual for approximation of living standards to measure disposable income after tax. Unfortunately, NFRJ questions measured 
incomes including tax, without information to exclude tax. This would make some biases for the following analyses. 
4 On the questionnaire, 9 categories are printed for NFRJ98, mostly separated in intervals of 2 million yen; 18 categories for 
NFRJ03, mostly separated in intervals of 1 million yen; 19 categories for NFRJ08, intervals are the almost same as NFRJ03. Note 
that respondents for NFRJ98 thus answered from less number of categories with wider intervals than for the other two surveys. In 
addition, there were some differences in the wording and the context for the question of household income among the 
questionnaires for three surveys. These differences may also reduce the comparability. 




income household Equivalent +=                                                             (1) 
 
The highest category for measurement of household income was 12 million yen or more (NFRJ98) or 16 million 
yen or more (NFRJ03/NFRJ08). For calculation of Equation (1), we assigned 1400 (NFRJ98) or 1700 
(NFRJ03/NFRJ08) to the upper limit h for these highest categories (in 10,000 yen).  
The measure of equivalent household income derived in this equation has a skewed distribution. In the 
following analysis, we employ this measure converted using the natural logarithm to approximate a normal 
distribution. This conversion resulted in omission of a few cases with no household income (=0) from the 
following analyses, because logarithm cannot be defined for zero. The results will, however, appear in tables 
with the figures converted through exponential transformation (which is the reverse function of logarithm) for 
easier interpretation.  
Table 3 shows the (geometric) mean values of equivalent household income. Grand mean for the all 
respondents is slightly higher for NFRJ98 (3333 thousand yen) than other two surveys (2921 and 2973 thousand 
yen).  
Gender gap is apparent in this equivalent household income. Figures for men are slightly higher than for 
women. A look at the values of equivalent household income shows that the figure for women was 7–10% lower 
than for men. However, when it comes to the magnitude of gender to determine equivalent household income, 
the difference by gender is not great. The coefficient of determination R2 is small, between 0.003 and 0.006.  
5.2.  Gender gap by marital history 
The variable of marital history is defined with a combination of two questions: (1) marital status at the survey 
date, and (2) experiences of divorce or death of the spouse. We distinguish six categories for marital history as 
those who have continued their first marriage, those who have widowed (with/without a spouse at the survey 
date), those who have divorced (with/without a spouse at the survey date), and unmarried (those who have no 
experience of marriage). The data contain a few respondents who have experiences both as widowed and as 
divorced; we categorized them as “divorced”.  See Table 4 for the distribution of marital history.   
Table 5 carries mean values of equivalent household income by marital history. In addition to the geometric 
mean for each category of marital history, Table 5 indicates the female/male ratio of the mean equivalent 
household income in its right column.  
Table 5 shows the greater variation among the categories of marital history for women. The ratio of 
equivalent household income for divorced (and having no spouse) women to that for women continuing their 
first marriage is about 52% (1788/3425) for NFRJ98, about 54% (1636/3023) for NFRJ03, and about 55% 
(1746/3150) for NFRJ08. There is thus great gap between these two categories of women. Male equivalent 
household income, on the other hand, does not vary so greatly by marital history. For NFRJ98, the figure is 3125 
thousand yen for divorced (and having no spouse) men, about 87% of that for men continuing their first marriage 
(3580 thousand yen). The difference between these two categories is greater for the other two surveys, the ratio 
of 78% (2448/3125) for NFRJ03 and 72% (2322/3230) for NFRJ08. The extent of difference is notwithstanding 
less than that for women.  
We turn to female/male ratios in the right column of Table 5 to find a gender gap among divorced people. 
Women’s equivalent household income for NFRJ98, NFRJ03, and NFRJ08 are respectively 57.2%, 68.8%, and 
75.2% of men’s among those who divorced and having no spouse. The gender gap has thus been lessened, owing 
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to the declining equivalent household income of divorced men, from 3125 (NFRJ98) to 2322 (NFRJ08) thousand 
yen, as we have mentioned above. However, there has been a significant gender gap perpetuated in this category, 
even for NFRJ08.  
We can also find a great gender gap for those who widowed in Table 5. Widowed population should be 
another focus5 concerning economic gender gap, but we do not address widowed cases in this paper. This is 
because our data is not suitable for analyses of widowed cases for two reasons. First, the sample size is too small 
to obtain statistically reliable results. There were only 68, 75, and 50 valid cases among men (see Table 5). 
Second, there is a bias in the survey subjects. In the case of widowed subjects, the spouses have deceased, and 
are therefore not included in the population of the survey. This makes it impossible to trace differences in the 
risks borne by each spouse, with data available only for the surviving spouse.  
For the remaining categories, other than divorced/widowed, Table 5 reveals little gender difference. For 
unmarried people, there is a considerable gender difference only for NFRJ98 with the female/male ratio of 
equivalent household at 84%, but almost no difference (about 100%) for NFRJ03 and NFRJ08. For those 
continuing their first marriage, the female/male ratio is 95% or more — though it is a naturally expected result 
from the definition of household income that wife and husband in the same household receive the same amount 
of income.  
Table 5 thus demonstrates the great gender gap among divorced or widowed people, with gender equality 
among those who are unmarried or continuing the first marriage. To put it another way, men and women receive 
the equal level of equivalent household income, as long as they remain unmarried or peacefully continue their 
first marriage. Gender gap appears, however, after the marriage dissolved: by death of one of the spouses, or by 
divorce.  
6.  Factors for the Gender Gap after Divorce 
6.1.  Cases and variables 
From the above results, it is clear that the gender gap appears among divorced people. Here we proceed to the 
next step of our question: What does create the gap? In the following analysis, we restricted the subject to those 
who have undergone divorce. According to Table 5, the sample includes at least 160 valid respondents for both 
men and women for each survey. The sample thus offers a sufficient number of cases for multivariate analyses. 
Moreover, in principle the other divorced spouse (i.e., the ex-wife or ex-husband of the respondent) should also 
be included in the survey population6. We can therefore think of the results from our analyses using sampled 
subjects of divorced population as reflecting the difference in risks borne by male and female spouses in the 
population of divorced couples.  
For further analyses, the following variables will be introduced, in addition to gender and the equivalent 
household income.  
 Age (classified in four classes as 28–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60–72 years old)  
                                                        
5 We shall investigate the gender gap among widowed people from such multiple perspectives as health/mortality, the system of 
inheritance, and social security benefits. Such questions are beyond the scope of the NFRJ project. They require other data 
containing information to measure demographic dynamics and social/economic/health status of aged population. 
6 This does not hold perfectly true for our data. There are limitations due to three reasons: (1) The subjects are limited to ages 
between 28–72; (2) Non-Japanese nationals and residents abroad are excluded from the population; and (3) There were a large 
number of nonresponses and unanswered questions. 
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 Education (see the caption below Table 6 for its classification)  
 Whether the respondent had remarried (i.e., whether or not he or she had a spouse at the survey date)  
 Whether the respondent lived alone  
 Co-residence with the respondent’s parents  
 Co-residence with a young child (see the explanation below)  
 Continuous regular employment (see the explanation below)  
Details about the last two variables are in the following two paragraphs.  
We define the variable “co-residence with a young child” considering for the following three conditions:    
(1) whether the child’s age was under 13, (2) co-residence with the child, and (3) the parent-child relationship. 
Information for the conditions (1) and (2) is obtained from the questions on household composition (NFRJ03) or 
the questions on children’s attributes (NFRJ98/NFRJ08). There may be a few number of cases for which the 
information on the children was incomplete7. But we can fortunately expect that we have enough information for 
most cases, unless the respondent had too many children. Unfortunately, however, when it comes to the 
condition (3), NFRJ data include no information to distinguish among a child in blood, an adopted child, and a 
stepchild. They also include no information to tell whether the child is a child of one’s (ex-)spouse or not. It 
causes a problem for us in specifying the parent-child relationship to detect children born from the marital life 
before divorce. Here we take a rough criterion to select the co-residing young children born from the former 
marriage: count the child under 13 years old, if the respondent had not remarried or the child’s age was greater 
than the duration since remarriage.  
We define the variable of “continuous regular employment” by the combination of two conditions: (1) the 
respondent’s employment status was “常時雇用されている一般従業者” (ordinary regular employee) at the 
survey date, and (2) she or he did not answered as having an experience of quitting job because of childbirth or 
childcare. The value will be 1, if both of the conditions are satisfied. Information for the condition (1) was from a 
question in a standardized format, which was common in all three surveys. But the question for the condition (2) 
was different among questions as a result of the efforts to revise the questionnaire for the precision in 
measurement, in sacrifice of comparability among surveys.  
6.2.  Gender differences in post-divorce life 
Table 6 shows male and female means for the variables used in our analysis. Most variables are two-value coded 
as 1 or 0 (i.e., so-called “dummy” variables), so that their means equate the proportion of the respondents for 
whom the condition is satisfied. Cases with missing values are deleted according to list-wise deletion criterion. 
For this reason, these data include fewer cases than Table 5.  
Table 6 shows that the equivalent household income is higher for men and lower for women. This is the same 
result as seen in Table 5.  
                                                        
7 The NFRJ08 data include the information (age and co-residence) of the first six living children. The NFRJ98 data include 
information on the age of the first five children (either living or dead) and on co-residence with the first three living children. We 
used that information to count co-residing young children. We might thereby miss some respondents to be counted as co-residing 
with their young children, if they have more than six (NFRJ08) or three (NFRJ98) children. For some cases, the respondent was 
not questioned or did not answered about the co-residence with the child; we counted such a case as a co-residing child, as far as 
the child was younger than 13 years old. 
 - 9 - 
Age distribution differs slightly between men and women. The women tend to be younger and the men tend 
to be older8.  
Gender differences are apparent in education. For both men and women, the modal category is high school, 
but the percentage is greater for women (50–52%) than for men (42–44%). Men show higher percentages of 
being university graduates (17–28%) than women do (less than 10%). Women show, instead, considerable 
percentage in the category of junior college (around 10%). Percentage at the compulsory level is almost equal in 
the NFRJ03 and NFRJ08 data, but slightly higher for men in the NFRJ98 data. On average, you can summarize 
that men received higher-level education.  
Gender differences by family/household conditions are as follows. While the proportion of men who 
remarried (i.e., those having spouses at the survey date) is 44–59%, for women the proportion is 29–30%. Men 
thus tend to remarry after divorce at higher likelihood than women. While the proportion of men living alone (in 
an one-person household) is 21–27%, for women this proportion is around 13%. The percentage is thus higher 
among men. However, almost no difference is found in the proportions of respondents living with parents for 
NFRJ03 at around 23%, with the lower figures for women in NFRJ98 (12.5%) and men in NFRJ08 (16.7%). On 
the other hand, while few men (3–6%) live together with young children, the cases of women doing so are 
sizable (13–20%).  
Gender differences are apparent in employment conditions as well. Around the half of men continued 
ordinary regular employment, but less than 20% of women have that status.  
6.3.  Regression analysis 
We used these variables in multiple linear regression analysis to predict equivalent household income. Although 
the dependent variable was converted through logarithm transformation, the results appear in Table 7 with 
estimated coefficients inversely transformed through an exponential function, accompanied with the 95% 
confidence intervals. We can thus interpret the figures on Table 7 as exhibiting multiplier effects on the 
equivalent household income. Three models were estimated.  
Model 1 checks for the effect of gender, controlling only age composition. The coefficient of the “female" 
variable is negative for all three surveys. This indicates that women’s equivalent household income tends to be 
lower in comparison with men’s. The effect was 0.683 for NFRJ98, 0.745 for NFRJ03, and 0.819 for NFRJ08. 
These values largely correspond to the weighted means of the female/male ratios for the two categories of 
“Divorced” in Table 5. The value has been rising in this decade, which reflects the narrowing gap between 
divorced men and women, we have seen.  
Model 2 introduces the main effects of the other variables. Education has significant effects by which higher-
level education brings about higher income, roughly speaking. The effect of remarriage (=having spouse) is 
positive. Co-residence with young children has a powerful impact: income would be lowered to 60–70% level by 
the presence of one’s children under 13 in the household. Other variables concerning household composition —
co-residence with parents 9  and one-person household— have no significant effect. Continuous regular 
                                                        
8 The gender difference in the age distribution may reflect the tendency toward marriage between an older husband and a younger 
wife. Alternatively, it may be the case that marriages between spouses with greater age differences are more likely to end in 
divorce. Whichever the case, the data contain a truncation effect in the age of the survey subjects, because they are sampled from 
the population of people aged 28–72. 
9 Murakami Akane (2009) suggests that divorced women can receive the benefits of living with parents in their own home. Such an 
economic benefit related to house rent does not appear in our analysis using income as the dependent variable. 
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employment has a great impact, raising the income by about 50–60%. After controlling for these effects, the 
variable “female” has no longer significant effect.  
Model 3 adds interaction effects between gender and household composition. To easily understand the 
complex results, we look at Table 8 summarizing the predicted effects based on Model 3 in Table 7. We find the 
clear effects of interaction for women, with higher income for remarried (=having spouse) women and lower 
income for women in one-person household. The former has income almost double the latter. In contrast, the 
effects are not clear for men, with no consistent effect by household composition.  
7.  Discussion 
7.1.  Summary of the findings 
The results of our analysis provide two interesting sights on the state and causality about economic gender gap in 
contemporary Japanese society.  
First, as we saw in Section 5, the economic disadvantages of women appear among divorced and widowed 
persons. Unmarried or married (continuing their first marriage) women have no significant disadvantage. This 
suggests that the growing divorced/widowed population —as a result of marriage instability or of population 
aging— is the main component of gender inequality. Although divorced/widowed people are still a minority in 
the Japanese population today, they are nevertheless the key to gender equality.  
Second, as we saw in Section 6, there are the four factors with significant effects on equivalent household 
income after divorce. We confirmed in Table 6 female-male differences in the four factors lowering women’s 
equivalent household income. We also found in Table 7 that gender has no significant direct effect on equivalent 
household income, after controlling for the four factors. The causes of the worsening of the standard of living of 
divorced women can thus be reduced to the following four factors.  
 Having a low level of education  
 Not having a continuous career as an ordinary regular employee  
 Co-residing with their young children  
 Not remarried  
These are similar to the results detected by Tanaka (2008). They also offer a quantitative evidence for the 
hypothesis of marital-life results, because the second and third factors are the very focus of the hypothesis, and 
they have the strong effect of lowering women’s standard of post-divorce living as derived from the hypothesis.  
In addition, as a technical finding, we identify the difference between SSM and NFRJ datasets because of the 
case selection. As we mentioned in Section 2.2, Tanaka’s (2008) analysis using the SSM2005-J data reported 
greater gender gap than Tanaka (2010) using the NFRJ03 data. This difference may be due to the fact that 
remarried people is not included in the analysis by SSM2005-J. The NFRJ03 data in Table 5 show that, among 
those who divorced but having no spouse, women’s equivalent household income is 66.8% of men’s. This 
approximately equates the result from SSM2005-J (Tanaka 2008).  
7.2.  Gender gap in pre-marriage investment, marital life, and post-divorce life 
Now we turn to theoretical perspective on lifecourse and gender gap. Figure 1 illustrates the process of making 
gender gap in post-divorce life. One’s life is divided into three stages: pre-marriage investment, marital life, and 
post-divorce life. We map the above-mentioned four factors on these stages.  
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The first factor is education as pre-marriage investment. In most cases, people’s school education ends before 
their marriage, by the early 20s. Once their school education completed, it is difficult to change afterwards. 
Education is so deeply instituted in the social stratification system that it continues to function as the resource to 
get the higher standard of living — even after divorce, of course.  
The second factor is specialization in marital life. Most couples conduct division of labor, for efficiency in 
their communal life. This brings about differences in their human capital and social status. Most husbands 
specialize in paid work and pursue their career as full-time regular employee, without housework burden. In 
contrast, most wives specialize in housework and give up full-time regular employment to take household 
responsibilities. As a result, there will be the difference in earning capacity between husbands and wives. A 
peaceful marital life could conceal the gap, as long as the spouses altruistically support each other10. However, 
when the marital life is broken, the gender gap will come up to the surface.  
The third factor is the assignment of the custody of the couple’s legitimate child. The Civil Code provides 
that parents can, as far as they are married, take joint custody of their legitimate child. However, once they 
divorced, the Civil Code does not allow the joint custody; one of the parents should have sole custody. This is 
instituted in the procedure of divorce, either by mutual consent or by a court decision. In today’s Japan, there is a 
strong tendency toward the mother becoming the custodial parent after divorce11. Taking custody requires high 
cost —including children’s living expenses, childcare service charges, educational investment, and opportunity 
cost due to a career interruption and shorter working hours. This is one of the main causes of gender gap in post-
divorce life.  
The fourth factor is the probability of remarriage. Results of our analyses have revealed the effect of 
remarriage enormously improving the living standards for divorced women. Therefore, if women remarried at 
high probability, it would contribute to lessen the gender gap after divorce. In reality, however, women remarry 
at lower probability than men do (Table 4 and Table 6). The majority of divorced women remain single after 
divorce. Hence remarriage does not serve well for gender equalization in post-divorce living standards.  
7.3.  Against gender gap as a result of marital life 
The above results indicate that the family system should bear the primary responsibility for the economic gender 
gap. Women are disadvantaged after divorce due to the gender gap created through various aspects of the family 
system. Gender-equal policy should include reformation of the family system to offset such disadvantage.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, we already have a proposal for such reformation —toward equity-oriented 
financial provision on divorce— advocated by family law scholars. They constructed the proposal on the 
consideration about specialization and children as results of marital life, which overlaps two of the four factors 
creating women’s post-divorce disadvantage detected in our analysis. On Figure 1, we can think of the area of 
marital life —between the two vertical lines of “marriage” and “divorce”— as the coverage of the reformation. 
                                                        
10 Altruism between married couple is normative, rather than voluntary. The Civil Code provides the responsibility of married 
couple to support each other (Article 752) and to share living expenses (Article 760), which is interpreted as providing that 
husband and wife shall keep the same standard of living between them. This interpretation has its root in the theorization of 
modern family law by Nakagawa Zen’nosuke (1928), and it has been an accepted legal theory today. However, it is also an 
accepted theory that such responsibility is terminated by divorce, with a few exceptions of advocators for the idea that the marital 
responsibility continues permanently, even after divorce. See a review of recent debates by Omura Atsushi (2010) to capture a 
current overview on those issues.  
11 This has been a recent phenomenon. Before 1960, the majority of custodial parents had been the fathers. Number of the cases of 
custodial mothers grown and exceeded that of fathers in the mid-1960s. Vital Statistics report that, since 2000, the divorced 
mothers have been the custodial parents at the rate of 80% or more; the fathers at the rate of 20% or less (according to the data 
compiled by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS 2011)). 
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Gender gap as a result of the two factors, “specialization” or “custody”, should thus fully be covered12 by 
financial provision on divorce, to eliminate the gap. Because the two factors exhibit a strong effect in our 
analysis, we can expect the great contribution by the equity-oriented reformation to promote gender equality, if it 
is properly carried out.  
However, the theoretical possibility aside, we find various obstacles in implementation of equity-oriented 
reformation. First, divorce has been a largely ignored phenomenon, even in family studies or in gender politics. 
Today’s reality is far from the establishment of norms that call divorced couples for a full settlement of human 
capital, social status, and responsibilities for children. Although some progress is being made from a legal 
perspective, no widespread consensus has been reached on the necessity for such reformation. It is likely to take 
many years until the equity-oriented principle for divorce law is established and norms are developed that 
effectively regulate people toward equitable behavior in circumstances of divorce. Second, as a result of the 
inactiveness in the research about marital-life results on post-divorce life, we have not compiled reliable 
evidence for decision-making for real divorce cases. There will thus be difficulties to make decision for real 
cases, even if the equity-oriented principle is accepted (Tanaka 2007a; Tanaka 2007b). Now we have launched 
on the starting line for the quantitative research of divorce, to uncover the reality of post-divorce life and to 
predict how law/policy changes effect the gender gap.  
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Table 2.  Synopsis of NFRJ surveys 
(A) About All NFRJ surveys (NFRJ98, NFRJ03, NFRJ08) 
Survey name 全国家族調査 (National Family Research of Japan) 
Survey organizer 日本家族社会学会 全国家族調査委員会(Japan Society of Family Sociology, NFRJ Committee) 
Survey company 社団法人 中央調査社 (Central Research Service Inc.) 
Survey area All over Japan  
Sampling method  Stratified two-stage probability sampling 
Survey method Self-administered questionnaire, home delivery, leave and pick-up 
Website http://www.wdc-jp.com/jsfs/english/nfrj.html 
 
(B) The first survey (NFRJ98) 
Population Japanese nationals living in Japan and born between 1921 and 1970  
(28 to 77 years old as of the end of 1998)   
Sample size 10,500 (response 6,985; response rate 66.5%)  
Survey period January to February 1999 
Data availability Deposited at the SSJ Data Archive by the University of Tokyo (Survey Number 0191) 
Data used in this paper From SSJ Data Archive, downloaded 2010.6.4 
We use only respondents aged 28–72 in this paper, to keep comparability with NFRJ08. 
 
(C) The second survey (NFRJ03) 
Population Japanese nationals living in Japan and born between 1926 and 1975 
(28 to 77 years old as of the end of 2003)  
Sample size 10,000 (response 6,302; response rate 63.0%)  
Survey period January to February 2004  
Data availability Deposited at the SSJ Data Archive by the University of Tokyo (Survey Number 0517) 
Data used in this paper From SSJ Data Archive, downloaded 2010.6.4 
We use only respondents aged 28–72 in this paper, to keep comparability with NFRJ08. 
 
(D) The third survey (NFRJ08) 
Population Japanese nationals living in Japan and born between 1936 and 1980 
(28 to 72 years old as of the end of 2008)  
Sample size 9,400 (response 5,203; response rate 55.4%)  
Survey period January to February 2004  
Data availability Close to the members of Japan Society of Family Sociology until summer 2011 
Data used in this paper Version 4.0 (2011.2.18 distribution) 
 
Table 1.  Trends in the composition of marital status in population of 25–69 years old, 1960–2005 
Male Female Year 
Unmarried Married Widow Divorced Total (Number) Unmarried Married Widow Divorced Total (Number) 
1960 11.7 84.1 3.0 1.2 100.0 (21,593,336) 7.2 75.6 14.3 2.9 100.0 (23,275,570)
1965 11.3 85.3 2.4 1.0 100.0 (24,114,635) 6.9 77.6 12.8 2.6 100.0 (25,807,568)
1970 11.4 85.6 1.8 1.1 100.0 (26,701,456) 6.6 79.1 11.6 2.8 100.0 (28,523,108)
1975 12.9 84.4 1.5 1.2 100.0 (30,233,046) 7.4 79.9 10.1 2.6 100.0 (31,986,738)
1980 14.0 83.2 1.3 1.5 100.0 (32,448,710) 7.5 80.7 8.8 3.0 100.0 (34,127,260)
1985 15.3 81.3 1.3 2.1 100.0 (33,996,126) 8.2 80.2 7.8 3.8 100.0 (35,444,839)
1990 17.2 79.0 1.4 2.4 100.0 (35,367,436) 9.8 79.2 6.9 4.1 100.0 (36,474,317)
1995 19.9 75.8 1.4 2.9 100.0 (37,036,122) 12.0 77.0 6.3 4.7 100.0 (37,662,753)
2000 23.1 72.1 1.4 3.4 100.0 (38,034,663) 14.7 74.1 5.7 5.5 100.0 (38,656,441)
2005 25.6 69.0 1.3 4.2 100.0 (37,895,517) 16.6 71.7 5.0 6.6 100.0 (38,574,018)
Excluding the unanswered cases. Calculated from Population Census (国勢調査), time series data, Table 4 “配偶関係 (4
区分),年齢 (5 歳階級), 男女別 15 歳以上人口: 全国 (大正 9 年～平成 17 年)” (da04.xls). Downloaded from “政府統
計の総合窓口” (Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan, http://www.e-stat.go.jp/, 2011.2.7). 








Table 4.  Distribution of marital history 
Widowed Divorced Survey Gender Continued  1st marriage  with spouse no spouse  with spouse no spouse
Unmarried Total (N) 
NFRJ98 Male 80.0  0.5  1.8  3.5  2.7  11.5  100.0  (3128)
 Female 77.6  0.3  6.9  2.9  4.6  7.7  100.0  (3399)
V=0.147 Total 78.8  0.4  4.5  3.2  3.6  9.5  100.0  (6527)
NFRJ03 Male 78.1  0.6  2.3  4.1  3.6  11.3  100.0  (2819)
 Female 77.5  0.3  6.7  2.7  5.6  7.2  100.0  (3148)
V=0.137 Total 77.8  0.4  4.6  3.4  4.6  9.2  100.0  (5967)
NFRJ08 Male 75.6 0.4 1.8 3.2 4.2 14.8 100.0  (2441)
 Female 74.0 0.3 5.4 3.0 7.3 10.0 100.0  (2743)
V=0.132 Total 74.8 0.3 3.7 3.1 5.9 12.3 100.0  (5184)












Table 3.  Gender and equivalent household income (geometric mean in 10,000 yen) 
  Male Female Total Female/Male Missing 
NFRJ98 Geometric mean 352.1  315.8  333.3  0.897   
R2=0.006 (Number) (2928) (2989) (5917)   (610) 
NFRJ03 Geometric mean 304.3  281.5  292.1  0.925   
R2=0.003 (Number) (2603) (2878) (5481)   (488) 
NFRJ08 Geometric mean 308.8  287.7  297.5  0.932   
R2=0.003 (Number) (2165) (2394) (4559)   (630) 
  
Table 5.  Gender, marital history, and equivalent household income (geometric mean in 10,000 yen) 
Survey  Marital History Male Female  Female/Male
 G. Mean N G. Mean N Ratio 
NFRJ98 Continued 1st marriage 358.0 (2363) 342.5 (2337) 0.957  
R2=0.047 Widowed, but with spouse 461.3 (14) 374.5 (6) 0.812  
 Widowed, no spouse 250.6 (54) 203.8 (202) 0.814  
 Divorced, but with spouse 338.5 (108) 315.8 (94) 0.933  
 Divorced, no spouse 312.5 (76) 178.8 (142) 0.572  
 Unmarried 339.4 (313) 284.9 (208) 0.840  
NFRJ03 Continued 1st marriage 312.5 (2038) 302.3 (2243) 0.968  
R2=0.040 Widowed, but with spouse 369.6 (15) 172.7 (9) 0.467  
 Widowed, no spouse 284.9 (60) 192.9 (185) 0.677  
 Divorced, but with spouse 282.2 (114) 305.2 (78) 1.081  
 Divorced, no spouse 244.8 (91) 163.6 (170) 0.668  
 Unmarried 279.5 (285) 280.6 (192) 1.004  
NFRJ08 Continued 1st marriage 323.0 (1641) 315.0 (1762) 0.975  
R2=0.057 Widowed, but with spouse 496.9 (8) 339.9 (6) 0.684  
 Widowed, no spouse 218.0 (42) 181.5 (136) 0.832  
 Divorced, but with spouse 284.9 (72) 281.0 (72) 0.986  
 Divorced, no spouse 232.2 (90) 174.6 (178) 0.752  
  Unmarried 279.2 (311) 279.0 (240) 0.999  
 
Results of ANOVA: p<0.05 for all of the main and interaction effects (by Type III SS).  
Classification of marital history is the same as Table 4. 
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Table 6.  Descriptive statistics for regression analysis (only those who underwent divorce) 
    Male   Female   Difference 
    Mean SD Mean SD Female−Male 
NFRJ98     
 
Equivalent household income* 5.792  0.728  5.413  0.865  −0.378 
Age 28–39 0.207   0.198   −0.008  
 40–49 0.234   0.293   0.059  
 50–59 0.288   0.302   0.014  
 60–72 0.272   0.207   −0.065  
Education Compulsory 0.326   0.250   −0.076  
 High school 0.424   0.509   0.085  
 Vocational school 0.027   0.103   0.076  
 Junior college 0.049   0.112   0.063  
 University 0.174   0.026   −0.148  
Having spouse 0.587  0.494  0.392  0.489  −0.195  
One-person household 0.212  0.410  0.125  0.331  −0.087  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.228  0.421  0.125  0.331  −0.103  
Children under 13** 0.033  0.178  0.129  0.336  0.097  
Continuous regular employment† 0.446  0.498  0.190  0.393  −0.256  
(Number) (184)    (232)     
NFRJ03      
  
Equivalent household income* 5.578  0.798  5.301  0.812  −0.277 
Age 28–39 0.152   0.257   0.105  
 40–49 0.294   0.306   0.012  
 50–59 0.284   0.261   −0.023  
 60–72 0.270   0.176   −0.094  
Education Compulsory 0.181   0.184   0.002  
 High school 0.431   0.506   0.075  
 Vocational school 0.103   0.118   0.015  
 Junior college 0.059   0.118   0.060  
 University 0.225   0.073   −0.152  
Having spouse 0.559  0.498  0.314  0.465  −0.245  
One-person household 0.235  0.425  0.139  0.346  −0.097  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.240  0.428  0.224  0.418  −0.016  
Children under 13** 0.049  0.216  0.196  0.398  0.147  
Continuous regular employment† 0.426  0.496  0.176  0.381  −0.251  
(Number)   (204)    (245)     
NFRJ08     
 
Equivalent household income* 5.539  0.786  5.316  0.819  −0.222 
Age 28–39 0.136   0.240   0.104  
 40–49 0.278   0.280   0.003  
 50–59 0.321   0.220   −0.101  
 60–72 0.265   0.260   −0.005  
Education Compulsory 0.154   0.167   0.012  
 High school 0.438   0.520   0.082  
 Vocational school 0.080   0.138   0.058  
 Junior college 0.043   0.085   0.042  
 University 0.284   0.089   −0.195  
Having spouse 0.444  0.498  0.293  0.456  −0.152  
One-person household 0.272  0.446  0.138  0.346  −0.133  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.167 0.374 0.224 0.417 0.057 
Children under 13** 0.056  0.230  0.159  0.366  0.103  
Continuous regular employment† 0.543  0.500  0.179  0.384  −0.364  
(Number)  (162)    (246)     
Mean: arithmetic mean.  SD: standard deviation.             *: Natural logarithm of equivalent household income in 10,000 yen. 
**: For those who had spouse, children were counted only when their age was greater than the duration since the remarriage. 
†: Those who had no experience of quitting their job because of childbirth or similar reasons, and were ordinary regular employees (常時雇用され
ている一般従業者) at the survey date.  
Categories for education: Compulsory (中学校); High school (高等学校, including miscellaneous category); Vocational school (専門学校, after 
graduation of high school); Junior college (短期大学, in two years, and 高等専門学校=technical collage); University (大学, in four years or 
more, and graduate school) 
 - 17 - 
Table 7.  Regression analysis of equivalent household income (in 10,000 yen)  
 
(A) NFRJ98 
 Effect 95% confidence interval 
Independent variables exp B Lower Upper 
 
Model 1: R2=0.062   
Female  0.683 0.583 0.799  
Age 28–39 0.866 0.692 1.083  
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 0.829 0.674 1.020  
 60–72 0.811 0.655 1.006  
(Constant) 373.082 315.244 441.531  
 
Model 2: R2=0.263   
Female  0.890 0.756 1.047  
Age 28–39 0.802 0.639 1.007  
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 0.752 0.622 0.910  
 60–72 0.863 0.706 1.055  
Education Compulsory 0.692 0.581 0.824  
 (ref.: High school) Vocational school 1.198 0.895 1.603  
 Junior college 1.045 0.804 1.358  
 University 1.481 1.135 1.933  
Having spouse 1.526 1.287 1.811  
One-person household 1.167 0.926 1.471  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.886 0.720 1.090  
Children under 13 0.603 0.452 0.803  
Continuous regular employment 1.536 1.296 1.822  
(Constant) 259.837 205.223 328.985  
 
Model 3: R2=0.296   
Female  0.835 0.616 1.131  
Age 28–39 0.772 0.617 0.966  
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 0.737 0.611 0.890  
 60–72 0.908 0.745 1.108  
Education Compulsory 0.690 0.581 0.819  
 (ref.: High school) Vocational school 1.131 0.848 1.510  
 Junior college 1.055 0.815 1.366  
 University 1.538 1.183 1.999  
Having spouse 1.300 0.991 1.706  
One-person household 1.466 1.045 2.055  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.884 0.671 1.164  
Children under 13 0.616 0.464 0.817  
Continuous regular employment 1.548 1.309 1.830  
Female × Having spouse 1.367 0.973 1.920  
Female × One-person household 0.570 0.363 0.895  
Female × Co-residing with one’s parents 1.108 0.742 1.656  
(Constant) 269.503 200.556 362.153  
 N = 416   (only for those underwent divorce) 
 
  [continuing] 
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Table 7.  Regression analysis of equivalent household income (in 10,000 yen) [continued] 
 
(B) NFRJ03 
 Effect 95% confidence interval 
Independent variables exp B Lower Upper 
 
Model 1: R2=0.041   
Female  0.748 0.643 0.870  
Age 28–39 0.924 0.743 1.149  
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 0.856 0.703 1.043  
 60–72 0.781 0.631 0.969  
(Constant) 299.490 254.301 352.708  
 
Model 2: R2=0.238   
Female  0.995 0.850 1.164  
Age 28–39 0.995 0.798 1.239  
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 0.813 0.676 0.979  
 60–72 0.947 0.774 1.159  
Education Compulsory 0.759 0.624 0.923  
 (ref.: High school) Vocational school 1.199 0.957 1.504  
 Junior college 1.120 0.877 1.430  
 University 1.633 1.323 2.014  
Having spouse 1.307 1.092 1.565  
One-person household 0.886 0.706 1.112  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.928 0.767 1.123  
Children under 13 0.669 0.528 0.848  
Continuous regular employment 1.470 1.249 1.729  
(Constant) 204.496 160.537 260.493  
 
Model 3: R2=0.268   
Female  0.741 0.530 1.034  
Age 28–39 0.950 0.765 1.181  
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 0.830 0.691 0.996  
 60–72 0.993 0.812 1.213  
Education Compulsory 0.756 0.624 0.917  
 (ref.: High school) Vocational school 1.160 0.928 1.450  
 Junior college 1.097 0.862 1.396  
 University 1.652 1.344 2.031  
Having spouse 0.908 0.675 1.221  
One-person household 0.803 0.564 1.144  
Co-residing with one’s parents 0.888 0.664 1.187  
Children under 13 0.703 0.556 0.890  
Continuous regular employment 1.559 1.325 1.834  
Female × Having spouse 1.898 1.305 2.759  
Female × One-person household 0.996 0.632 1.570  
Female × Co-residing with one’s parents 1.068 0.734 1.553  
(Constant) 250.015 181.293 344.787  
  N = 449   (only for those underwent divorce) 
 
  [continuing] 
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Table 7.  Regression analysis of equivalent household income (in 10,000 yen) [continued] 
 
(C) NFRJ08 
 Effect 95% confidence interval 
Independent variables exp B Lower Upper 
 
Model 1: R2=0.050   
Female  0.819 0.698 0.961 
Age 28–39 0.790 0.626 0.998 
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 1.059 0.857 1.309 
 60–72 0.761 0.614 0.943 
(Constant) 277.827 233.836 330.094 
 
Model 2: R2=0.270   
Female  1.110 0.941 1.311 
Age 28–39 0.877 0.697 1.103 
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 1.015 0.835 1.234 
 60–72 0.966 0.787 1.185 
Education Compulsory 0.690 0.550 0.865 
 (ref.: High school) Vocational school 1.301 1.035 1.634 
 Junior college 1.245 0.936 1.655 
 University 1.385 1.132 1.694 
Having spouse 1.384 1.147 1.671 
One-person household 1.012 0.816 1.256 
Co-residing with one’s parents 1.135 0.915 1.408 
Children under 13 0.601 0.470 0.768 
Continuous regular employment 1.613 1.367 1.904 
(Constant) 157.728 112.927 220.302 
 
Model 3: R2=0.283  
Female  1.153 0.818 1.626 
Age 28–39 0.871 0.693 1.095 
(ref.: 50–59) 40–49 1.023 0.842 1.244 
 60–72 0.966 0.788 1.185 
Education Compulsory 0.692 0.553 0.867 
 (ref.: High school) Vocational school 1.275 1.014 1.605 
 Junior college 1.267 0.954 1.683 
 University 1.387 1.134 1.696 
Having spouse 1.284 0.904 1.824 
One-person household 1.191 0.824 1.720 
Co-residing with one’s parents 1.230 0.812 1.864 
Children under 13 0.601 0.470 0.768 
Continuous regular employment 1.640 1.388 1.937 
Female × Having spouse 1.182 0.781 1.788 
Female × One-person household 0.707 0.447 1.119 
Female × Co-residing with one’s parents 0.891 0.556 1.427 
(Constant) 157.728 112.927 220.302 
  N = 408   (only for those underwent divorce) 
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Table 8.  Effects of gender, remarriage, and household composition 
  Female  Male  











NFRJ98 1.483  0.697  0.818  1.300  1.466  0.884  
NFRJ03 1.276  0.592  0.702  0.908  0.803  0.888  
NFRJ08 1.750  0.971  1.264  1.284  1.191  1.230  
 
Calculated based on the estimated effects for the Model 3 on Table 7.  


























Figure 1.  Paths toward the gender gap in post-divorce living standard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
